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I. Introduction
Every year, millions of nonimmigrants arrive in the United
States for various reasons. Under U.S. immigration laws, there
are several methods by which foreigners can enter the United
States and stay permanently.3 One such method is for an alien to
marry a U.S. citizen or permanent resident.' For purposes of
remaining permanently in the United States after marriage, the
alien must file an application to adjust his or her status5 "as a result
of the marriage."6 Congress did not provide guidelines on how to
interpret the "as a result of marriage" language in the immigration
statute; however, in 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
declared in Choin v. Mukasey that an alien whose marriage
dissolves prior to being granted permanent residency may still be
eligible to adjust their status.
This Note will discuss and analyze Choin. Part II of this Note
will provide a brief overview of Choin, concentrating on the
relevant facts, procedural history, and the court's holding and
reasoning. Part III will lay out the relevant background law for
understanding the Choin decision. Part IV will analyze the Choin
decision, paying particular attention to deference, statutory
amendments and statutory interpretation. Part V of this Note will
conclude that Choin was decided correctly but will also discuss the
potential consequence of the decision: the opening up of the
possibility for an increase in marriage-based immigration fraud.
Additionally, this Note will draw attention to the fact that the
decision could have a broader reach than anticipated by the Ninth
Circuit.
2 "During 2007, there were 171 million nonimmigrant admissions to the United
States according to DHS workload estimates." MACREADIE BARR, KELLY JEFFERYS, &
RANDALL MONGER, DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., NONIMMIGRANT ADMISSIONS TO THE
UNITED STATES: 2007, at 1 (2008).
3 See generally 8 C.F.R. § 214 (2008) (discussing nonimmigrant admission,
extension and maintenance of status).
4 See 8 U.S.C.S. § 1255(d) (2007).
5 "Adjustment of Status is a special benefit allowing a person to obtain permanent
residency without having to travel abroad and be readmitted with an immigrant visa."
RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 76 (AILA Publications, 2nd
ed., 2009) (2006).
6 See id.
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II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Yalena Choin (Choin), a Russian citizen, entered the United
States on a fiancde visa with her two children on December 4,
1998. 7 She was engaged to Albert Tapia, a U.S. citizen, and
married him on February 20, 1999.8 Choin then filed to adjust her
status to a lawful permanent resident on April 10, 1999 based on
her marriage.9 While Choin's application was pending and she
was waiting for her interview with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS),"° Choin and her husband divorced."
The divorce occurred "five days short of two years from the date
[she] filed her application."' 2  The INS rendered a decision on
Choin's application on August 21, 2001 and denied her application
to adjust her status to a lawful permanent resident. 3
B. Procedural History
The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal
proceedings against Choin, and an Immigration Judge ordered that
Choin be removed. 4 Choin subsequently appealed to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA).' 5 The BIA denied Choin's appeal,
7 Choin v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1116, 1117 (9th Cir. 2008).
8 Id. at 1118.
9 Id.
10 "On March 1, 2003, the INS ceased to exist as an independent agency within the
Department of Justice, and its functions were transferred to the newly formed
Department of Homeland Security." Id. at 1118 n. 2 (quoting Homeland Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 441, 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2192, 2205 (codified at 6
U.S.C. § 101, et seq.)).
11 Choin, 537 F.3dat 1118.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 The Board of Immigration Appeals is the highest administrative tribunal on
immigration and nationality matters in the United States. The Board is responsible for
applying the immigration and nationality laws uniformly throughout the United States.
Accordingly, the Board has been given nationwide jurisdiction to review the orders of
Immigration Judges and certain decisions made by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), and to provide guidance to the Immigration Judges, DHS, and others
through published decisions. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1) (2008).
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using the same reasoning as the Immigration Judge. 16 Both
reasoned that Choin was ineligible to adjust her status to a
permanent resident under 8 U.S.C.S. § 1255(d), 7 because she had
divorced her U.S. citizen husband prior to her case being
adjudicated. 8 Choin sought review of the BIA's holding from the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. 9
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the government argued that
Choin was ineligible based on the language of the statute
governing adjustment of status.20 The government explained her
ineligibility on the basis that she had divorced her U.S. citizen
husband before the INS had adjudicated her application for
adjustment of status. 2' The court held that both the government
and BIA's interpretation of the statute was contrary to legislative
intent and that there was no durational element requirement in the
22statute. 2 Thus, the court concluded that the BIA had incorrectly
ruled against Choin and held that she should be given a fair
adjudication of her adjustment of status application.23
C. Holding
After laying out the necessary statutory framework for
analyzing fianc6(e) immigration and adjustment of status
applications, the court began its opinion by concentrating on, and
interpreting, the "as a result of the marriage of the nonimmigrant"
language in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 245(d).24
16 Choin, 537 F.3d at 1117.
17 [T]he Attorney General may not adjust ... the status of an alien lawfully
admitted to the United States... except to that of alien lawfully admitted to the
United States on a conditional basis . . . as result of marriage of the
nonimmigrant to the citizen who filed the petition to accord the alien's
nonimmigrant status.
8 U.S.C.S. § 1255(d) (2007) (internal citations omitted).
18 Choin, 537 F.3d at 1118.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1120-21.
23 Id. at 1121.
24 The Attorney General may not adjust . . . the status of a [K visa holder]
except to that of an alien lawfully admitted to the United States on a conditional
basis under section 1186(a) of this title as a result of the marriage of the
nonimmigrant... to the citizen who filed the [K visa petition].
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The court announced that the statute was ambiguous and thus did
not "definitively resolve the eligibility of a petitioner in Choin's
circumstances., 25 The court noted that the language in the statute
could be interpreted in two ways: 1) As meant to impose a
durational requirement by excluding alien spouses whose
marriages no longer exist at the time the immigration officer
renders a decision on their application; or 2) that the application at
the time it is reviewed must be based on the fact of marriage.26
The court then analyzed the level of deference to accord the
agency's interpretation of the statute.27  It rejected the
government's argument that the court should apply Chevron
deference 28 and adopt the BIA's interpretation of the statute, and
instead cited a precedent which declared that unpublished BIA
decisions were not afforded Chevron deference. 29  Rather,
unpublished BIA decisions would be afforded Skidmore
deference.3" The Ninth Circuit, in applying Skidmore deference to
the BIA's decision, explained that the BIA had not issued a
thorough explanation for its decision to deny Choin's
application.3 Thus, to determine the strength of the two varying
interpretations of the statute, the Ninth Circuit looked at the
purpose of the statute as part of a broader statutory framework.32
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments' (IMFA)33 goal of deterring marriage fraud for
8 U.S.C.S. § 1255(d) (2007) (emphasis added).
25 Choin, 537 F.3d at 1119.
26 Id. at 1120.
27 Id.
28 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984). The Chevron Court announced that the two questions for statutory interpretation
analysis were: 1) Whether Congress has spoken to the precise legal issue; and 2) If not,
whether the agency's construction is permissible. See id. at 863-67.
29 Choin, 537 F.3d at 1120 (citing Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006,
1012 (9th Cir. 2006)).
30 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). Findings of an
administrative agent which are not controlling on the courts are given a certain level of
deference which would "depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements and all
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." See id. at 139-40.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1184(d), 1186a
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immigration purposes.34 According to the court, the government's
interpretation of the statue, which required an ongoing marriage at
the time of INS adjudication, contravened the purpose of the
IMFA.35 The court explained that Congress had amended the
statute to allow alien spouses to adjust their status to conditional
permanent residents for the first two years of marriage.36 The
court also opined that Congress could have imposed a durational
requirement but had not done so. 7
The Ninth Circuit further discussed analogous cases in which
the court had ruled against the government's proposed
interpretation.38 In Freeman v. Gonzales,39 a woman whose
husband had died after she filed her adjustment of status
application was eligible to adjust her status.40 The court reasoned
that even though immigration officers may need time to review
and process applications, an alien's adjustment of status
application cannot depend on when DHS happened to reach the
pending application.4" The Ninth Circuit therefore held that "the
purpose and context of § 245(d) [did] not support the
government's reading of the statute that requires the automatic
removal of immigrants, whose marriages end in divorce while
their application for adjustment of status languishes in the
agency's file cabinet., 42 However, as in Freeman, the fact that
Choin's marriage was based on good faith did not automatically
entitled her to permanent resident status.43 Rather, the purpose of
the court's ruling was "to ensure that in making the decision to
accord [adjustment of] status, the immigration authorities are
properly construing the law."44
(2007).
34 Id.
35 Choin v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. (citing Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2006)).
39 444 F.3d 1031(9th Cir. 2006). See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
40 Id.
41 Choin, 537 F.3dat 1121.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 1121 n.5.
44 Id. (citing Freeman, 444 F.3d 1031).
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Ill.Background Law
A. Alien Marriage and U.S. Immigration: Statutory
Framework
The U.S. immigration laws have a long-standing tradition of
reuniting families.45 In light of this, an alien can travel to the
United States as the fianc6(e) of a U.S. citizen if the Consular
officer in the alien's home country issues a K fianc6(e) visa.46 A
U.S. citizen, who is the fianc6(e) of an alien, must file a petition in
the United States for the alien who is applying for a fianc6(e)
visa. The U.S. citizen petitioner must make a showing that the
parties have previously met in person within two years before the
date of filing the petition, have a bona fide intention to marry, and
are "legally able and actually willing to conclude a valid marriage
in the United States within a period of ninety days after the alien's
arrival."48  The alien and the U.S. citizen fianc6(e) must marry
within three months of the alien's arrival in the United States, or
else the alien and any minor children are required to leave the
country.49
After the marriage of the alien and the U.S. citizen, the alien
becomes eligible to adjust her status to a conditional permanent
resident.5" Within ninety days of the two-year anniversary of
gaining conditional permanent resident status, the couple can
jointly petition to have the non-citizen's conditions removed."
The couple must show that they are still married and that they did
45 See Fraudulent Marriage and Fiance Arrangements To Obtain Permanent
Resident Immigration Status: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.
1-3 (1986) (statements of Sens. Alan Simpson and Paul Simon (explaining that the
United States immigration system is founded on the principle of family reunification,
and most importantly, spousal reunification)).
46 See Choin, 537 F.3d at 1118 (discussing the steps by which an alien spouse can
become a permanent U.S. resident).
47 8 U.S.C. § 1184(d)(1) (2007).
48 Id.
49 See id. But see Moss v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 651 F.2d 1091
(5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a two day delay in the marriage of a U.S. citizen and an
alien due to extraneous circumstances should not be a basis on which to deny alien
adjustment application; rather the immigration judge must determine the cause for the
delay).
50 8 U.S.C. § 1255(d) (2007).
51 See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(1)(A) (2007).
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not enter into marriage for immigration purposes.52 If the marriage
ends before the couple can file the petition, then the non-citizen
must apply for a waiver of the petition requirement by attesting
that it was a bona fide marriage which was entered into in good
faith. 3 An alien who holds a nonimmigrant visa that is revoked
becomes removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(b), and an
immigration judge may order the alien's removal.54
B. Alien Marriage and U.S. Immigration: BIA Decisions &
Case Law
1. Matter of Boromand: Status of Marriage at the Time
ofAdjustment (Nonviability vs. Legal Termination)
In a 1980 BIA decision, Matter of Boromand,55 the court held
that an alien's petition for permanent residence based on marriage
to a U.S. citizen could be rejected because the "marriage upon
which [the] visa petition was based has been legally terminated."56
In Boromand, an Iranian citizen entered the United States as a
nonimmigrant student on January 10, 1973." 7 Approximately
seven months later, on August 8, 1973, he married a U.S. citizen
in Chicago, Illinois. 8 His wife filed a relative visa petition on his
behalf and, based on his marriage, his status was adjusted to
lawful permanent resident on August 7, 1974."9
The alien was subsequently notified that his adjustment of
status decision would be rescinded on March 11, 1975.60 The
immigration judge based his decision on that fact that the alien and
his U.S. citizen wife, although lawfully married, did not reside in
the same house at the time Boromand's adjustment of status was
52 See 8 U.S.C. §1 186a(d)(1)(A)(i) (2007).
53 See 8 U.S.C. §1 186a(c)(4) (2007).
54 See Choin v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1116, 1117 (9th Cir. 2008) (Immigration Judge
ordered alien spouse removed because her adjustment of status application is denied).
See also lbragimov v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 2007) (BIA orders removal
for an alien who arrived in the country after overstaying during his previous visit).
55 17 I. & N. Dec. 450, 454 (B.I.A. 1980).
56 Id. at 453-54.
57 Id. at 450.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 450-51.
60 Id. at451.
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granted.61 Additionally, during his adjustment of status interview,
the alien had represented himself inaccurately by telling the
immigration officer that he resided with his wife.62  The
immigration judge therefore concluded that Boromand was not
eligible to adjust his status to a permanent resident based on his
misrepresentations .63
During the appeals process, the BLA discussed the case of
Matter of Sosa,4 a case which "addressed the issue of separation
and marriage viability and its relationship to an adjustment of
status application., 65 The BIA explained that in Sosa, the statute
was construed as requiring that joint petitioners establish a bona
fide marriage that is "viable and ongoing. ' '66  The BIA then
announced that it was overruling Sosa to the extent that it "holds
that an alien seeking admission to the United States as the spouse
of the United States citizen or lawful permanent resident may be
excluded solely because the marriage upon which is based is
'nonviable.' 67 However, the BIA defined "nonviability" to mean
"factually dead" and noted that legal termination of marriage
would still be a basis for the denial of an adjustment of status
application.68
Furthermore, Boromand had made several misrepresentations,
the BIA reasoned that his marriage to the U.S. citizen spouse was
bona fide and explained that the misrepresentations about his
living arrangements were not material because an adjustment of
status application cannot be denied solely on the basis of the
nonviability of a marriage at the time of adjustment.69 Thus, in the
present case, the alien's adjustment of status could not be
rescinded on that basis.70
61 See In re Matter of Boromand, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 451.
62 Id. at 451.
63 Id.
64 15 I. & N. Dec. 572 (B.I.A. 1976).
65 In re Matter of Boromand, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 452.
66 Id. at 453.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 454 (quoting Dabaghian v. Civiletti, 607 F.2d 868, 870n. 1 (9th Cir. 1979)).
69 Id. at 454-55.
70 Id.
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2. In re Lenning: Effect of Legal Separation on
Adjustment of Status
The BIA addressed how a legal separation would affect an
adjustment of status application in the case of Lenning.7 1 A U.S.
citizen filed a petition on behalf of his alien spouse for adjustment
of status based on their marriage on July 13, 1974.72 On
September 27, 1979, the couple executed a separation agreement
which settled all rights between them including financial and
property rights.73 The U.S. citizen filed a petition on his wife's
behalf after the separation agreement on October 16, 1979. 74 The
District Director denied the petition on February 21, 1980, and the
U.S. citizen appealed. 75 The petitioner argued that based on the
reasoning in Chan v. Bell,76 although they were separated, his
spouse was still eligible to adjust her status because the marriage
was entered into good faith and was still "legally unterminated. 77
The BIA explained that previous BIA decisions had attempted
to use a "viability" test to determine whether a couple's marital
relationship should be the basis to approve or reject an
application. 7' The BIA noted it had expressly overruled that test
and observed in Chan that "where parties enter into a valid
marriage, and there is nothing to show that they have since
obtained a legal separation or dissolution of that marriage, a visa
petition filed on behalf of the alien spouse should not be denied
solely because the parties are not residing together., 79 The BIA
distinguished Lenning, however, because there was a valid legal
separation."0
71 In re Lenning, 17 I. & N. Dec. 476, 476 (B.I.A. 1980).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 "'There is no requirement that a marriage, entered into in good faith, must last
any certain number of days, months or years. Much less is there any requirement that a
bona fide and lasting marital relationship ... exists as of the time the INS questions the
validity of the marriage."' Chan v. Bell, 464 F.Supp. 125, 129 (D.D.C. 1978) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Whetstone v. I. & N., 561 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1977)).
77 In re Lenning, 17 1. & N. Dec. at 476.
78 Id. at 477.
79 Id. (emphasis omitted).
80 Id.
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Because both of the spouses were residents of New York, the
BIA analyzed a New York law that allowed a couple with a valid
separation agreement to sue each other for a divorce after one year
on the basis of the separation agreement.8' The BIA pointed out
that in New York, the separation agreement entered into by the
couple is more similar to that of a legal separation agreement since
either party could seek a divorce based on the agreement.82 The
dissent, however, charged that "[t]he premise on which the
Board's interpretation rests, that people who execute separation
agreements are set irreversibly on a permanent course away from
each other is unsound."83 Nevertheless, the BIA ultimately held
that the separation agreement was similar to a divorce decree, and
therefore the District Director had correctly denied the U.S.
citizen's spouse visa petition.84
3. Freeman v. Gonzales: Death of U.S. Citizen Spouse
Before Adjustment of Status Decision
Another relevant precedent is the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Freeman v. Gonzales. Carla Freeman was a dual citizen of South
Africa and Italy.85 While in the United States, she met and
married a U.S. citizen, Robert Freeman.86 After the marriage, she
returned to South Africa and subsequently returned to the United
States in June 2001 under the terms of a special Visa Waiver
Program87 which granted her a ninety-day visitor stay in the
country.88 Before the expiration of her visa waiver, her husband
filed a petition on her behalf, and she filed an application to adjust
81 Id. at 478.
82 Id.
83 In re Lenning, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 480 (Farb, J., dissenting).
84 Id. at 479 (majority opinion).
85 Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031, 1032 (9th Cir. 2006).
86 Id.
87 See id. at 1032 n.1 (citing 8 U.S.C. §§ 1187, 1255(c)(4)) ("The Visa Waiver
Program (VWP) authorizes citizens of certain enumerated countries, including Italy, one
of Mrs. Freeman's countries of citizenship, to enter the United States without a visa for a
term no longer than 90 days. In exchange for this procedural benefit, VWP entrants
waive their right to challenge any removal action other than on the basis of asylum (the
no-contest clause). They are, however, allowed to seek adjustment of their status by
filing an immediate relation petition.")
88 Id.
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her status to that of a lawful permanent resident.89 Her husband
died while her application was pending.9"
In May 2004, when her application was finally reviewed, the
Immigration Officer ruled that Freeman could no longer be
considered a "spouse"'" for purposes of adjusting her status and
ordered her to leave the country.9 2 Additionally, because she was
subject to provisions of the Visa Waiver Program, she could
neither renew her application for adjustment of status nor seek
review of the decision by an immigration judge.93 Freeman
petitioned the Federal District Court for a writ of habeas corpus.9n
She asserted that the Immigration Officer's ruling that she was no
longer a "spouse" and therefore ineligible to adjust her status to
permanent was erroneous. 95 She also challenged the Immigration
Officer's findings that she had waived any right of review. 96 The
district court denied her petition, and she appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. 97
The Circuit Court analyzed the statutory interpretation of the
word "spouse" as it pertains to adjustment of status under
immigration laws.98 The court in its analysis considered other
sections of the statute and indicated that Congress had explicitly
introduced a durational requirement in other parts of the statute but
had not done the same in the part of the statute where the word
"spouse" appears. 99 The Ninth Circuit therefore concluded that
there was no durational element needed to satisfy the "spouse"
requirement in the statute.100 Thus, Freeman was eligible as the
spouse of a U.S. citizen to file an adjustment of status
89 Id. at 1033.
90 Id. at 1032.
91 An alien must have been the spouse of a U.S. citizen for at least two years at the
time of the U.S. citizen's death. Mr. Freeman died shortly before the couple's first
wedding anniversary. See 8 U.S.C.S. §1 151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2008).
92 See Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1033.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1037-38.
99 Id. at 1037-43.
100 Idat 1043.
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application. 11
C. Deference to an Agency's Unpublished Opinion
Federal courts normally grant deference to agency actions as
long as the agency's action is in line with a specific intent of
Congress expressed in a statute. 112 In the context of immigration
decisions, courts have taken different stances when faced with the
question of how much deference to afford a BIA decision.0 3 An
analysis of some of these decisions is therefore necessary.
1. Ninth Circuit
Pedro Garcia-Quintero entered the United States from Mexico
in 1986 and resided in the country for twenty years. 4 He married
a lawful permanent resident and was accepted into the Family
United Program (FUP) in 1993.1'5 In 1998, he became a
permanent resident. 1 6  Garcia-Quintero received a Notice to
Appear in Removal Proceedings in June 2001 because he
attempted to smuggle an illegal alien into the United States.
10 7
Based on his testimony during the removal proceedings, the
Immigration Judge held that he had knowingly participated in
smuggling an illegal alien into the United States and was therefore
101 Id.
102 See generally KimberlyJ. Rice, Delegation, Deference and Doctrine: Re-
evaluating the Federal Courts' Relationship with Federal Administrative Agencies (Apr.
2, 2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) (discussing
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and noting that
courts usually defer to agency decisions).
103 See, e.g., Rotimi v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 55, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that an
unpublished BIA decision that does not rely on precedent for its definition of an
ambiguous phrase does not receive Chevron deference, because it is not "promulgated
under [the BIA's] authority to make rules carrying the force of law . . . " (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012-
14 (9th Cir. 2006) (opining that an unpublished BIA decision which does not have the
force of law would not receive Chevron deference).
104 Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1009.
105 See id. ("The FUP permits qualified alien spouses or unmarried children of
legalized aliens, who entered the United States before 1988 and have continuously
resided in the United States since that time, to apply for the benefits of the program,
which include protection from deportation and authorization to work in the United
States.")
106 Id. at 1010.
107 Id.
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removable."°8 Garcia-Quintero appealed to the BIA.' 09
While his appeal was pending, Garcia-Quintero also filed a
motion to remand his case to Immigration Court so that an
Immigration Judge could consider his application for cancellation
of removal."' He argued that he was eligible for cancellation of
removal because his acceptance into the FUP qualified as
"admitted in any status""' per the language of the statute."' The
BIA denied his appeal and, in the process, rejected his argument
that he was "admitted in any status" based on his acceptance into
the FUP." 3 He subsequently petitioned for review to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals." 4
The Ninth Circuit asked "whether [the court] should accord the
BIA's decision... deferential review prescribed by the Supreme
Court" in Chevron."5  The court elucidated that Chevron
deference only applied when the agency's interpretation carries the
"force of law.""' 6 The court noted that the Supreme Court in INS
v. Aguirre-Aguirre' had applied Chevron deference to an
unpublished BIA decision only after finding that the BIA acted
within a statutory power conferred by Congress through the
Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA). The court also
explained that Mead"8 placed limits on Chevron deference and its
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1010-11 (2006).
111 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(a) (2006) ("Cancellation of removal is available, at the
Attorney General's discretion, for an LPR who is inadmissible or deportable if he: 1) has
been an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, 2) has
resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any
status, and 3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.").
112 Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d 1006, 1011 (2006).
113 Id.
"14 Id.
115 Id.
116 See id. at 1012.
117 526 U.S. 415,424 (1999).
118 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that United
States Customs Service ruling letters should not be given Chevron deference because the
statute that grants Customs the power to issue ruling letters "gives no indication that
Congress meant to delegate authority to Customs to issue classification rulings with the
force of law.").
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applicability to an agency's interpretation of statutes. 19 Based on
Mead, "the essential factor in determining whether an agency
action warrants Chevron deference is its precedential value."
12
The court explained that the BIA decision lacked precedential
value because "a case must be decided by a three-member panel if
it presents [t]he need to establish a precedent construing the
5121
meaning of laws, regulations, or procedures. In this case, only
one member of the panel had rendered the decision.
122
The court then announced that Skidmore deference was the
proper level of deference to accord a non-precedential BIA
decision. 123  The court analyzed the BIA's interpretation of
"admitted in any status" by looking at various sections of the
statute and determining whether the phrase appeared in other
sections. 12 ' The court also looked at other circuit court decisions
that addressed the issue and concluded that the FUP qualified
under the "admitted in any status" language found in the statute,
and therefore granted Quintero's petition for review of his
cancellation of removal claim.1
25
2. Second & Eighth Circuits
In Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales,126 the Second Circuit left open
the question on whether it would afford a non-precedential BIA
decision Chevron deference. 127 In Ucelo-Gomez, the BIA affirmed
'19 Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012 (2006).
120 Id. (quoting Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2006)).
See also High Sierra Hikers Ass'n v. Blackwell, 390 F.3d 630, 648 (9th Cir. 2004)
("refusing to accord Chevron deference when the agency was not acting in a way that
would have precedential value for subsequent parties") (internal quotation marks
omitted).
121 Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1013 (quoting CFR § 1003.1(e)(6)(ii) (2007)).
122 Id. at 1012; see also Board of Immigration Appeals, Practice Manual (2004),
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/vll/qapracmanual/pracmanual/chapl.pdf ("[A]
single Board Member decides cases unless the case falls into one of six categories that
require a decision by a panel of three Board Members [such as] the need to establish a
precedent construing the meaning of laws, regulations or procedures.") (emphasis
added).
123 See Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1014.
124 Id. at 1018.
125 Id. at 1015-20.
126 464 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2006).
127 Id. at 167.
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an immigration judge's determination without an opinion.' The
Second Circuit remanded the case to the BIA to make a
determination of "whether affluent Guatemalans [may] constitute
a particular social group within the INA."'29 The Second Circuit
also announced that
when we remand because the BIA has not yet spoken with
sufficient clarity, it will often be up to the BIA to decide
whether to issue a precedential or non-precedential
opinion. And where the former is the case, we (of course)
must grant the BIA's responsive opinion Chevron
deference, assuming the basic requirements of Chevron are
met. 13
In Godinez-Arroyo v. Mukasey,'3' the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to rule on the issue of how much deference to
afford an unpublished BIA decision because, even after applying a
lesser level of Skidmore deference, the Eighth Circuit found that
the BIA's decision was persuasive.'32  The Eighth Circuit,
however, noted that it had given unpublished BIA decisions a high
level of deference in the past, although a conclusive determination
was not made as to whether a sliding scale of deference should be
applied. The issue rested on whether the BIA issued a published
or an unpublished opinion.'33 The Eighth Circuit also highlighted
the fact that the Supreme Court had afforded an unpublished BIA
decision Chevron deference. 1
34
128 Id.
129 Id. at 170.
130 Id.
131 540 F.3d 848 (8th Cir. 2008)
132 See id. at 852 (holding that a Missouri statute under which alien was convicted
listed crimes which could satisfy the "moral turpitude" deportation requirement in 8
U.S.C.S. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)).
133 Id. at 851.
134 In INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424 (1999), the Supreme Court applied
Chevron deference to a BIA interpretation and reversed the Ninth Circuit ruling but
noted that Chevron deference applies to the BIA because of the statutory allocation of
power laid out by Congress in the INA. See id. at 425. Additionally, the BIA was acting
within its authority, because its actions were consistent with statutory provisions. See id.
at 430-33.
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IV. Legal Analysis
A. Choin 's Level of Deference to the BIA 's Statutory
Interpretation is Consistent with Precedent
In Chevron, the Supreme Court provided a two-step analysis to
determine whether an agency's decision is consistent with the
statutory grant upon which the agency is acting.'35 The Court
reasoned that if "Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue," then the unambiguous language of the statute is
controlling and thus agency interpretation will be given
deference.' 36  In later cases, however, the Court made the
distinction that Chevron deference was only available when
questions are based on the "force of the law."' 37 Thus, in Mead,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held
that the U.S. Custom Service's classification of day planners as
diaries, which subjected them to tariffs, was not entitled to
Chevron deference.138 The court explained that "there is no
indication on the statute's face that Congress meant to delegate
authority to Customs to issue classification rulings with the force
of law."'
139
In Choin's case, when the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was
faced with questions of statutory interpretation and how much
deference to afford the BIA's interpretation of a statute, the court
cited Garcia-Quintero and held that "when the BIA advances its
interpretation of an ambiguous statute in an unpublished decision,
that interpretation is not entitled to Chevron deference" because it
lacks precedential value. 40  The Ninth Circuit remarked that the
135 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
136 Id. at 842.
137 See, e.g., Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944) (holding that opinions by
Administrator of the Fair Labor Standards Act does not merit Chevron deference);
United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 221-22 (2001) (holding that Chevron deference
will not be applied to United States Customs Service "ruling letters" which interpreted
wording in a tariff-setting statute); Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 430-33 (1999) (holding that a
BIA decision which contained a thorough explanation of a statute and carried the force
of law should be afforded Chevron deference).
138 Mead, 533 U.S. at 221-22.
139 Id. at 226-27.
140 Choin v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Garcia-Quintero
v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2006)). See also Chan v. Reno, 113 F.3d
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statutory interpretation at issue did not carry the force of law and
was therefore not entitled to Chevron deference. The Ninth
Circuit thus applied the Skidmore guidelines.4' in analyzing how
much deference to give the BIA's interpretation.'42 The court
emphasized that the BIA decision which denied Choin's petition
was limited to two brief paragraphs.'43 Furthermore, the Ninth
Circuit announced that its deference to the BIA decision was
"based only on the inherent strength of the agency's
interpretation."' ' When the BIA rendered its decision, it provided
very little detail as to why Choin's petition was refused; therefore,
the BIA decision was given little deference. "4' Following the
Skidmore holding, the court embarked on a de novo review of the
BIA's statutory interpretation. 
146
Additionally, although the Second and Eighth Circuits have
never addressed the issue on how both courts would rule on the
deference issue, the Second Circuit has stated in dicta that
decisions which lacked precedential value would not be afforded
Chevron deference.1 47 The Eighth Circuit has applied Skidmore
deference to an unpublished BIA decision.1 48  Additionally, the
Supreme Court in Aguirre afforded an unpublished BIA decision
Chevron deference but mentioned that the decision carried the
force of law required for Chevron deference because the BIA had
provided a thorough explanation. 49  The Ninth Circuit
distinguished the thorough explanation provided by the BIA in
Aguirre from the BIA's limited two-paragraph explanation in
Choin.150 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit's use of Skidmore
deference was appropriate in Choin's case.151
1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 1997).
141 See Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 139-40.
142 Choin, 537 F.3d at 1120.
143 See id.
144 Id.
145 See id. at 1120.
146 Id. at 1120-21.
147 See Ucelo-Gomez v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 163, 168 (2d Cir. 2006).
148 See Godinez-Arroyo v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 848, 851 (8th Cir. 2008).
149 See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 430-33 (1999).
15o See Choin, 537 F.3d at 1120.
151 See id.
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B. Historical Analysis of Statutes and Amendments are in
Accordance with the Ninth Circuit 's Interpretation
Historically, U.S. immigration policy has protected the family
unit. 112 Under U.S. immigration laws, relatives can petition for
"immediate relatives"'' to be admitted to the country; there is no
limit on these types of petitions.'54 Congress, in 1986, enacted the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments "to balance the
competing policies of promoting family reunification and
preventing marriage fraud.'
155
Prior to the IMFA, a U.S. citizen could file a petition for the
alien spouse to be granted permanent residency and the alien
spouse would simultaneously file an application to adjust his or
her status to a permanent resident. 156 Based upon the petition and
an interview, the immigration officer made an initial determination
whether the facts in the petition were true and subsequently
approved or rejected an adjustment of status application. 5 If
approved and the alien spouse became a permanent resident, the
alien spouse was eligible to become a naturalized U.S. citizen in
three years."' No further inquiry was made into the legitimacy of
the marriage and thus if two parties in a fraudulent marriage made
it through both the petition and interview phase, they became
insulated from any further investigation unless one party
voluntarily reported the marriage fraud to immigration
authorities.'59 "The Act itself contain[ed] no statutory definition of
"marriage" that would aid an [immigration officer] in evaluating a
marriage under immigration law.' 160
152 See James A. Jones, The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments: Sham
Marriages or Sham Legislation, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 679,680 (1997).
153 "[T]he children, spouses and parents of a citizen of the United States. 8
U.S.C.S § 115 1(b) (2007).
154 See Jones, supra note 152, at 680.
155 See id. at 681. See also Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1184(d), 1186a (2007).
156 See Vonnell C. Tingle, Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986:
Locking In by Locking Out?, 27 J. FAM. L. 733, 736 (1989).
157 Id. at 736.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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One of the major problems confronting Congress in
amending the Act to deter immigration marriage fraud
was to ensure there would be no corresponding
infringement upon the rights of law abiding spouses. A
provision that deterred sham marriages but simultaneously
crippled honest marriages would not be in keeping with
the overall purpose of family reunification. With this in
mind, Congress passed the Amendments that establish a
deterrent in a two year conditional requirement.'6
Congressional hearings emphasized that Congress and
immigration officers were concerned with persons who were
trying to circumvent the normal process for immigrating to the
United States, and thus the amendments were meant to deter these
practices. '62
Post-IMFA, aliens who enter the United States as K visa
holders become conditional residents for the first two years of
their permanent residency, and both alien and U.S. citizen spouse
can file a petition to remove conditions at the end of two years.'63
If the marriage ends before the petition is filed, the alien spouse
can "apply for a waiver of the petition requirement by showing
that her marriage was entered into in 'good faith' and that the
immigrant 'was not at fault in failing' to file the joint petition.' ' 64
The Ninth Circuit in Choin reasoned that the waiver shows that
a non-citizen spouse is still given the benefit to show that her
marriage was entered into in good faith even though it ended in
divorce.' 65 The amendment to the statute to include the waiver
requirement also shows that Congress did not intend to
concentrate on the marriage's failure or success.'66 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit accurately proposed that the purpose of the IMFA
did not support the government's broad reading of the statute,
which automatically makes divorce a basis for the denial of
161 Id. at 740.
162 See Immigration Marriage Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., I st
Sess. 3-22 (1985) (statement of Alan C. Nelson, Comm'r, Immigr. & Naturalization
Service).
163 See Choin v. Mukasey, 537 F.3d 1116, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2008).
164 Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C.S. § 1186(a)(c)(4)(B) (2007)).
165 Id. at 1121.
166 See id.
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adjustment of status, irrespective of the fact that the marriage was
entered into in good faith but ended in divorce.'67
C. Post-IMFA: BIA Decisions and Case Law Show a
Justifiable Shift in Law, at Least in the Ninth Circuit
Pre-IMFA, the BIA announced in Boromand that divorce
could be used as a basis to deny an alien's adjustment of status
application. 68 Additionally in Lenning, when the BIA was faced
with the question of how a legal separation affects an alien's
adjustment of status application, the BIA reasoned that legal
separation was analogous to a divorce. 169 The BIA therefore ruled
that legal separation could also be used as a basis to deny an
adjustment of status application. 7 '
Post-IMFA, the BIA announced in Freeman that an alien
spouse's adjustment of status application could not be denied on
the basis of the U.S. citizen petitioner's death. 7' Although after
the promulgation of the IMFA the BIA did not revisit the issue of
whether divorce or legal separation could be used as basis for
denying an adjustment of status application, the Ninth Circuit
explained that the Freeman decision was analogous to Choin's
circumstances."7 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that nothing in the
statute indicated Choin's divorce precluded her from adjusting her
status to a permanent resident.'
The Ninth Circuit also highlighted the importance of s delay in
processing contributed to Choin's dilemma. Choin's application
was valid when it was submitted and only became invalid because
DHS did not render a decision on her application until after two
years had passed, by which time she was divorced.'74 Allowing
divorce to automatically make petitioners ineligible to adjust their
status in such a circumstance undermines and ignores the good
faith marriage on which the application was based, as well as the
167 See id. at 1120.
168 In re Matter of Boromand, 17 I. & N. Dec. 450, 454 (BIA 1980).
169 In re Lenning, 17 I. & N. Dec. 476, 478-79 (BIA 1980).
170 Id.
171 Freeman v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2006).
172 Choin, 537 F.3d at 1121 (citing Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1031).
173 Id.
174 Id.
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timely filing of the application. It is important to note, however,
that the Ninth Circuit appropriately cautioned that Choin was not
automatically eligible to adjust her status to a permanent
resident.175 However, she should have the opportunity to have her
application considered for adjustment, which would subject her
application to the discretion of the Attorney General.
1 16
V. Conclusion
Choin v. Mukasey was decided correctly. An analysis of the
statutory language as part of a broader immigration scheme and
post-IMFA cases show that the statute does not include a
durational element requirement. Although neither the Eighth nor
the Second Circuit have directly addressed how much deference to
afford an unpublished BIA decision, the Ninth Circuit correctly
recognized that the BIA decision in Choin did not carry
precedential weight and therefore was not entitled to Chevron
deference. Furthermore, although Boromand and Lenning were
not appealed and were therefore the law at the time they were
decided, subsequent statutory amendments bolster the notion that
Congress's intention was to limit fraudulent marriages, not to
make it difficult for aliens with good faith marriages to adjust their
status. Additionally, Choin recognizes that it is contrary to the
purpose of U.S. immigration laws to deny applications based on
marriages that were valid when they are filed but have ended in
divorce by the time the application is finally received by DHS.
, The Choin decision may, however, present other issues in the
future. Choin was not expressly limited to K visa holders. Thus,
it may be interpreted to apply to other pending marriage-based
adjustment of status cases where divorce takes place prior to the
application being reviewed. It may take further litigation in other
courts or an amendment by Congress to provide uniformity in the
application of the statute. Until then, at least in the Ninth Circuit,
the Choin decision correctly remains the governing law.
NANA ADJOA ATSEM
175 See id. at 1121 n.5.
176 See id.
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